

CS 5319
Advanced Discrete Structure

Lecture 10:
Introduction to Number Theory III

Outline

- Divisibility
- Greatest Common Divisor
- Fundamental Theorem of Arithmetic
- Modular Arithmetic
- Euler Phi Function
- **RSA Cryptosystem**

Reference: Course Notes of MIT 6.042J (Fall 05)
by Prof. Meyer and Prof. Rubinfeld

RSA Cryptosystem

- A cryptosystem allows a sender to encrypt a message M into some form C so that only the intended receiver can decrypt C back to M
- Most cryptosystems are symmetric, where the sender and the receiver have to *share* a secret key in order to perform the encoding and decoding
 - we can encrypt if and only if we can decrypt
- Major problem : How can the receiver and sender agree on the secret key in the first place ?

RSA Cryptosystem

- In 1977, Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman announced a scheme which does not need a shared secret key
- This is widely known as the RSA cryptosystem
 - Indeed, a similar scheme was invented earlier in 1973 by Ellis and Cocks
 - Since these schemes do not need shared secret keys, they are called **public key cryptosystems**
- The following describes how RSA works

RSA Cryptosystem

Setup. Receiver performs the following :

- Choose two distinct primes p and q . Let $n = p \cdot q$
- Select an integer e coprime to $\varphi(n)$.
 - The pair (e, n) is the *public key* and the receiver tells all the others
- Find the unique d such that $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\varphi(n)}$.
 - The pair (d, n) is the *secret key*, and the receiver keeps this hidden

RSA Cryptosystem

Encryption. Sender performs the following :

- Get the public key (e, n) of the receiver
- Given a message M , with $0 < M < n$, encrypt M by computing

$$C = M^e \text{ rem } n$$

- Send C to the receiver

RSA Cryptosystem

Decryption. Receiver performs the following :

- Receive C from sender
- Decrypt C by computing

$$M = C^d \text{ rem } n$$

Question : Why does RSA work ??

RSA Cryptosystem

Theorem 9:

Decryption of RSA works.

Proof: When M is coprime to n .

Since $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\varphi(n)}$, there is an integer t such that $ed = 1 + t \varphi(n)$. Thus

$$C^d \equiv M^{ed} \equiv M^{1 + t \varphi(n)} \equiv M \pmod{n}$$

$$\rightarrow M = C^d \text{ rem } n$$

RSA Cryptosystem

Proof (cont) : When M is not coprime to n .

Suppose M is a multiple of p (but not q). Then

$$C^d \equiv M^{ed} \equiv 0 \equiv M \pmod{p}$$

$$\begin{aligned} C^d &\equiv M^{ed} \equiv M^{1+t\varphi(n)} \\ &\equiv M (M^{q-1})^{t(p-1)} \equiv M \pmod{q} \end{aligned}$$

→ $C^d - M$ is a multiple of both p and q

→ $C^d \equiv M \pmod{n}$ [why?]

RSA Cryptosystem

Ex : Finding Public and Secret Keys

- Suppose receiver chooses primes $p = 7$ and $q = 11$
 - Then $n = 77$, with $\varphi(n) = (7 - 1)(11 - 1) = 60$
 - Suppose the receiver choose $e = 7$, since 7 is coprime to 60
 - The corresponding d becomes 43, since
$$43 \times 7 = 301 \equiv 1 \pmod{60}$$
- ➔ Public key = $(7, 77)$; Secret key = $(43, 77)$

RSA Cryptosystem

Ex : Encryption and Decryption

- If sender wants to send $M = 4$, she encrypts it as

$$\begin{aligned} C &= 4^7 \pmod{77} \\ &= 16384 \pmod{77} = 60 \end{aligned}$$

- When receiver receives $C = 60$, he decrypts it as

$$M = 60^{43} \pmod{77} = 4$$

Note: $60^2 \equiv 58$, $60^4 \equiv 53$, $60^8 \equiv 37$, $60^{16} \equiv 60$, $60^{32} \equiv 58 \pmod{77}$

$$\begin{aligned} \rightarrow 60^{43} &\equiv 60^{32} \times 60^8 \times 60^2 \times 60 \\ &\equiv 58 \times 37 \times 58 \times 60 \equiv 4 \pmod{77} \end{aligned}$$

Security of RSA

- Security of RSA relies on the assumption below :
Given the public key (e, n) and C , it is difficult to compute the message M
 - ➔ This relies on the assumption that given the public key (e, n) , it is difficult to compute d
 - ➔ This further relies on the assumption that it is difficult to factor n into p and q
- It is recommended that n is at least 2048 bits long

Security of RSA

- Because RSA is now widely used, many people wants to break RSA
- Some weaknesses in RSA are known.

Example :

- If the prime factors of either $p - 1$ or $q - 1$ are all small, the technique by Pollard (1974) can factor n quickly
- Also true if the prime factors of either $p + 1$ or $q + 1$ are all small (Williams (1982))

Security of RSA

Theorem 10:

If p and q are ‘close’, then RSA is insecure.

Proof:

If p and q are ‘close’, then $(p + q) / 2$ is not much larger than \sqrt{n} (we know that it is at least as big)

Now, suppose $p > q$ and we set

$$x = (p + q) / 2, \quad y = (p - q) / 2$$

Security of RSA

Proof (cont) :

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Thus } n &= p \cdot q \\ &= x^2 - y^2 = (x + y)(x - y)\end{aligned}$$

Hence, if an attacker can express n as a difference of two squares, she can factor n

To do this, the attacker tests the numbers

$$\lceil \sqrt{n} \rceil, \lceil \sqrt{n} \rceil + 1, \lceil \sqrt{n} \rceil + 2, \dots$$

until finding s such that $s^2 - n$ is a square number

Security of RSA

Proof (cont) :

The number of tests is equal to

$$x - \lceil \sqrt{n} \rceil = (p + q) / 2 - \lceil \sqrt{n} \rceil$$

which is small

More precisely, if $p = (1 + \varepsilon)\sqrt{n}$, then the number of tests is approximately :

$$\left(\frac{(1 + \varepsilon) + (1 + \varepsilon)^{-1}}{2} - 1 \right) \sqrt{n} = \frac{\varepsilon^2 \sqrt{n}}{2(1 + \varepsilon)}$$

Security of RSA

Ex : Primes p and q are too close

If $n = 56759$,

then the ceiling of its square root is 239.

By testing $s = 239, 240, \dots$ we find that

$$240^2 - 56759 = 841 = 29^2$$

→ Thus we have

$$n = 56759 = 240^2 - 29^2 = 269 \times 211$$